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Abstract— Networks are hard to manage and in spite of
all the so called holistic management packages, things are
getting worse. Further, there is a general lack of research on
fundamentals and an increasing reliance on temporary “band-
aids”. We argue that the difficulty of network management
can partly be attributed to a fundamental flaw in the existing
architecture: protocols expose all their internal details and
hence, the complexity of the ever-evolving data plane encum-
bers the management plane. Guided by this observation, in
this paper we explore an alternative approach and propose
Complexity Oblivious Network Management (CONMan), a
network architecture in which the management interface of
data-plane protocols includes minimal protocol-specific infor-
mation. This restricts the operational complexity of protocols
to their implementation and allows the management plane
to achieve high level policies in a structured fashion. Apart
from building the CONMan interface of a few protocols and
a management tool that can achieve high-level configuration
goals based on this interface, our preliminary experience with
applying this tool to real world VPN configuration indicates
the architecture’s potential to alleviate the difficulty of network
management.
I. INTRODUCTION
IP networks are hard to manage. Network management
(installation, configuration, provisioning, monitoring, test-
ing, debugging) requires detailed knowledge of many dif-
ferent network components, each with its own management
interface. To cope, network managers rely on a host of
tools ranging from sophisticated centralized network man-
agement packages to home-brewed scripts and elementary
tools such as ping and traceroute. For instance, our or-
ganization uses half a dozen different tools, commercial
and public domain, and has over 100K lines of scripts
for managing the switch and router infrastructure alone
(not including email, servers, DNS, DHCP, billing, etc.).
In spite of their ever increasing sophistication, management
tools seem to be waging a losing battle which is shown by
rising management costs and network downtime. A recent
survey [22] showed that 80% of the IT budget in enterprises
is devoted to maintain just the status quo - in spite of this,
configuration errors account for 62% of network downtime.
We believe that the management troubles of the Internet
have been aggravated by the lack of research on fundamen-
tals. Instead, there is an increasing reliance on temporary
“band-aids” that have evolved piecemeal as needed. While
this has allowed a number of flaws to creep into the way we
manage networks, in this paper we focus on one specific
shortcoming:
Today, protocols and devices expose their internal de-
tails leading to a deluge of complexity that burdens
the management plane.
For instance, it is not uncommon for a network device to
have thousands of manageable objects. A review of SNMP
MIB modules found more than 13,000 MIB objects in IETF
MIBs alone [37]; MIBDepot [55] lists 6200 MIBs from 142
vendors for a total of nearly a million MIB objects. A single
router configuration file can consist of more than 10,000
command lines [43]. Encumbering the management plane
with all this complexity leads to these problems:
• Perception differs from reality. Management applications
need to effectively reverse engineer the capabilities and
the functionality of protocols and devices from their
detailed MIBs. The low-level and non-intuitive nature of
these parameters makes this task difficult, if not impossi-
ble [32].
• Error-prone configuration. Network configuration in-
volves mapping high-level policies and goals to the values
of protocol parameters. Since management applications
don’t have an understanding of the underlying network in
the first place, they often resort to a cycle of setting the
parameters and correlating events to see if the high level
goal was achieved or not. Apart from being haphazard,
the noise in measurements and correlations is often the
root-cause of misconfigurations and related errors. The
inability to understand the network’s operation also makes
debugging these errors very difficult [25].
• Fragmentation of tools. Since devices and their exposed
details keep evolving at a frantic pace, management
applications tend to lag behind the power curve [30]. Ad-
ditionally, the inability of standard management interfaces
(IETF MIBs) to keep pace with data plane development
has led to a plethora of vendor specific MIBs and even
vendor specific management applications and has put
us in a situation where no one management approach
suffices. For example, SNMPLink [34] lists more than
1000 management applications, many of them being ven-
dor specific command line or HTML-based tools. Hence,
the Internet management plane doesn’t have anything
analogous to the IP “thin waist” around which the Internet
data-plane is built.
• Lack of dependency maintenance. Management state is
highly inter-dependent. These dependencies are not re-
flected in the existing set-up; thus, when a low-level value
changes, the appropriate dependent changes don’t always
happen [32]. Instances of improper filtering because the
2address assigned to some machine changed, or the appli-
cation was started on some other port are very common.
Recent work details the challenges involved in tracking
such dependencies in the existing set-up [13] and gives
examples of how failure to track them leads to problems
in large networks [24].
These shortcomings indicate that an (extreme) alternative
worth exploring is to confine the operational complexity of
protocols to their implementation. As a matter of fact, we
observe that almost all data-plane protocols share some very
basic characteristics that should, in theory, suffice for the
management of the network. Guided by this observation,
we adopt a more modest approach and argue that:
The management interface of data-plane protocols
should contain as little protocol-specific information
as possible.
This allows all data-plane protocols to have a generic
yet simple management interface. In this paper we present
the design and implementation of a network architecture,
Complexity Oblivious Network Management (CONMan),
based on this principle. In CONMan, all protocols and
devices express their capability and their functionality using
a generic abstraction. This allows the management plane to
understand the potential of the underlying network, to con-
figure it in line with the desired high-level policies and to
fix it when something breaks, without being encumbered by
the details of the protocol/device implementation. Having a
fixed interface between the management plane and the data
plane also allows for independent evolution of the two. To
this effect, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We present the detailed design of a network architecture
that minimizes the protocol-specific information in the
management interface of data-plane protocols. We also
present protocol-independent configuration primitives that
can be used to interact with this interface and hence,
manage the network.
• We describe the implementation of the management inter-
face of a few protocols in compliance with the proposed
architecture.
• We detail the implementation of a management applica-
tion that, given the abstraction of the protocols and de-
vices in the network, can achieve high-level configuration
goals using the aforementioned primitives.
• The paper presents the use of CONMan in a real-world
configuration scenario (VPN configuration) to highlight
its advantages over the status quo. Further, we also use
a naive but hopefully informative metric to compare the
protocol agnosticity of CONMan configurations against
today’s configurations in three different scenarios (GRE
tunnels, MPLS LSPs and VLANs).
Note that CONMan doesn’t reduce the total system com-
plexity; it only attempts to correct the skewed division of
functionality between management done inside the managed
device and that done outside the managed device. While
the fact that management applications don’t have to deal
with myriad protocol details reduces their burden, protocols
still need various low-level details in order to operate. With
CONMan, it is the protocol implementation that uses the
high-level primitives invoked by the management applica-
tions and out-of-band communication with other protocols
to determine these. This, in effect, puts the responsibility
for detailed understanding of protocol operation on the pro-
tocol implementor. Since the protocol implementer requires
this knowledge in any event, this seems to be a smarter
placement of functionality.
CONMan does not change the operation of data plane
protocols nor does it dictate the way they are implemented
– only the management interface of each protocol need con-
form to our proposal. Thus, while the management interface
gives the appearance of protocol modularity, the protocol
implementation itself may be modular or monolithic. In
other words, a non contribution of this paper is the notion
of implementation modularity.
Finally, we believe that the approach presented in this
paper has value for all aspects of network management.
While we briefly comment on some of these such as the
ease of tracking dependencies and debugging errors with
CONMan in place, the primary focus of this paper is
basic configuration. Further, while our implementation and
evaluation efforts serve as a sanity check for the proposal,
they represent merely a first stab at an alternative approach
towards network management. However, the fallacies of the
existing architecture and the importance of alleviating them
to improve network manageability are not disputable. In
this context, we hope that our proposal would stimulate
discussion about structured management of networks and
hence, serve as a step towards the holy grail of self
managing networks.
II. CONMAN ARCHITECTURE
Our architecture consists of devices (routers, switches,
hosts, etc.) and one or more network managers (NMs). A
NM is a software entity that resides on one of the network
devices and manages some or all of them. Each device has
a globally unique, topology independent identifier (device-
id) that can carry cryptographic meaning (for example, by
hashing a public key). Each device also has an internal
management agent (MA) that is responsible for the device’s
participation in the management plane. While the rest of the
paper talks about a device performing management tasks, in
actuality it is the device’s MA that is responsible for these.
All protocols and applications in devices are modeled as
protocol modules. Each protocol module has a name as well
as an identifier that is unique within the device. Examples
of module names include “IPv4”, “RFC791”, or even a
URI (which might be useful for naming applications). Thus,
modules can be uniquely referred to using tuples of the form
<module name, module-id, device-id>.
3A. Management Channel
As mentioned in section I, the piecemeal evolution of
management approaches has resulted in many flaws in the
way we manage networks. One such flaw is that the existing
management plane depends on the data plane [7,17]. For
example, SNMP operates on top of the data plane and
hence, management protocols rely on the correct operation
of the very thing they are supposed to manage. In recent
work, Greenberg et. al. [17] discussed the implications
of this dependency loop and proposed a technique for
achieving a self-bootstrapping, operationally independent
management plane. While such management plane indepen-
dence can be established using a few other approaches (for
instance, a more generalized and self-bootstrapping version
of the separate management network that is used by some
large ISPs), we agree with their basic hypothesis and in this
paper assume the presence of a management channel. This
management channel should be independent of the data-
plane, should not require any pre-configuration and should
allow devices in the network to communicate with the NM.
However, we do not dictate if the management channel
operates or does not operate over the same physical links
as used by the data-plane. Some implications of keeping
this channel configuration-free and other related issues are
detailed in section V.
B. Overview
Our approach derives from two key observations: First,
the main purpose of a network is to provide paths between
certain applications on certain hosts while preventing cer-
tain other applications and hosts from using those paths.1
Second, we observe that most data-plane protocols have
some basic characteristics whose knowledge should suffice
for managing the aforementioned paths and hence, for net-
work management in general. For instance, most protocols
have the ability to connect to certain other protocols, to
switch packets, filter packets, queue packets and so on.
We believe that it is these basic characteristics that should
serve as the narrow waist for Internet’s management plane.
Consequently, the management plane only maps the high-
level communication goal into the path through the network
(i.e. which protocols should connected and how) and the
protocols themselves figure out the low-level parameters
that they need to operate.
In our proposal, we try to capture these basic charac-
teristics using a generic abstraction called the Module Ab-
straction – all protocol modules in CONMan self-describe
themselves using this abstraction. To this effect, we model
every protocol module as a node with connections to other
nodes, certain generic switching capabilities, certain generic
filtering capabilities, certain performance and security char-
acteristics, and certain dependencies (figure 1). Thus, the
1Of course, this is a simplification since the paths must perform
adequately, have certain security properties, etc. but the basic argument
still applies.
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Fig. 1. Modules, pipes, and dependencies form a graph that describes
the operation of a device (in particular) and the network (in general).
The figure on the right denotes the major components of the module
abstraction. Note that some modules may not require all elements of the
abstraction to describe themselves.
abstraction describes what the protocol is capable of (po-
tential) and what it depends on (dependencies). Further, the
module can be configured to operate in a certain fashion
(actual) by manipulating its abstraction using the CONMan
primitives. Such modeling of protocols using a generic
abstraction decouples the data and the management plane
so that they can evolve independently of each other.
Each device in the network uses the management channel
to inform the NM of its physical connectivity, all modules
that it contains, and their respective module abstractions.
The module abstraction allows the NM to understand ex-
actly how packets may flow (or not flow) through a given
module and hence, from application to application. This
provides the NM with the real picture of the network - it
does not need to reverse engineer numerous low-level and
non-intuitive parameters.
Given the network’s real picture and the high-level goals
and policies that need to be satisfied, the NM builds a graph
of modules in various devices that satisfy these. This graph
captures how each module should operate. The NM can
then use the management channel to invoke the appropriate
CONMan primitives and configure the modules accordingly.
Thus, the NM can configure the entire network from the
ground up with (almost) no protocol-specific knowledge.
We believe that such as approach would ameliorate a lot of
the problems afflicting network management today.
C. Module Abstraction
There are two kinds of modules: data plane modules and
control plane modules. Examples of data plane modules (or
data modules for short) include TCP, IP, Ethernet, while
examples of control plane modules (or control modules for
short) include routing algorithms and negotiation algorithms
like IPSec’s IKE or PPP’s LCP and NCPs.
Data modules connect to each other to carry data packets.
These connections are called pipes. Control modules also
connect to data modules using pipes for delivery services.
Data modules may require the use of a control module; we
refer to this as a dependency. For instance, in Figure 1,
the IPsec module has a (data plane) pipe to IP, and has a
dependency on IKE, which in turn has a pipe to UDP. Ulti-
mately, modules, pipes, and dependencies form a graph that
in some sense describes the operation of the network. The
4data-modules self-describe themselves using the abstraction
shown on the right in figure 1. Below we briefly comment
on the components of this abstraction:
1) Pipes: Up and Down pipes connect modules to other
modules above and below themselves in the same device.
Such pipes are point-to-point only. Point-to-point pipes
are modeled as unidirectional (and usually come in pairs),
though for simplicity we present them as bidirectional. The
actual network links are modeled as Physical pipes and can
be point-to-point or broadcast. Hence, the path between
two modules in two different devices is the sequence of
up-down and physical pipes through which packets travel
between the modules. Of these, the NM can create up-down
pipes. It cannot create physical pipes, but can discover and
enable them. Also, pipes have identifiers which the NM
can use to refer to them. Applications can also lead to
creation of pipes. For example, a HTTP-client initiating a
TCP connection may lead to up-down pipes between the
following module pairs: {HTTP-client, TCP}, {TCP, IP},
and {IP, ETH}. The NM can dynamically discover and
potentially disallow such pipes.
Modules are associated with a list of connectable-
modules. For example, the connectable-modules for the
down pipe of a particular TCP module might be restricted
to {IPv4, IPv6} implying that the TCP implementation in
question can only operate on top of (have a down pipe to)
IPv4 or IPv6.
While modules pass packets between up and down pipes,
the end goal is to be able to communicate with modules in
other devices. To capture this, each pipe is associated with
one or more peers modules. For example, the peer module
for a down-pipe of a TCP module would be the remote
TCP module to which the down-pipe ultimately leads to.
Also, each module is associated with a set of peerable-
modules. For example, the peerable-modules for a TCP
module are {TCP} while the peerable-modules for a HTTP-
server module are {HTTP-client}.
In effect, the notion of pipes abstracts away the details
that protocols need for basic operation. Given a connectivity
goal, the NM simply builds the corresponding path by
creating pipes while the modules determine the low-level
parameters. For instance, creating a down pipe from an IP
module to an ETH module might be a part of establishing
IP connectivity between two hosts and may cause the IP
module to communicate with its peer IP module through
the management channel to exchange the MAC address of
the ETH module below it.2 Apart from communication with
peer modules, modules may need more help in determining
the low-level parameters – they express these as dependen-
cies that need to be satisfied before the pipe can be created.
2) Switch: Switches capture the ability of modules to
pass packets between up, down and physical pipes. A switch
2Note that ARP achieves this in the existing set-up and even with
CONMan, the IP module could just as well rely on ARP for the peer’s
MAC address.
can be unicast or multicast and can have a small number
of basic configurations: packets pass between down and
up pipes ([down ⇒ up] and [up ⇒ down] switching, e.g.
TCP module), [down ⇒ down] switching (e.g. IP module
with forwarding enabled), [up ⇒ up] switching (e.g. IP
module with loopback functionality), [up ⇒ phy], [phy ⇒
up] and [phy ⇒ phy] switching (eg. Ethernet module). A
module advertises its switching capabilities. The NM uses
this and the information about the connectable-modules of
each module to build a potential connectivity graph for the
network. As we show in section III-C, this allows the NM to
determine what paths are and are not possible. For instance,
the ETH module in a Layer-2 switching device advertises
that it can do [phy ⇒ phy] switching and so, can be used
by itself along a path between two devices that the NM is
trying to connect. As a contrast, the ETH module in a router
would not have [phy ⇒ phy] switching capability and so,
the NM must use it in conjunction with the IP module on
the router.
When incorporating a module as part of a path, the
NM must direct the module as to how packets must be
switched between the pipes just created – this is the actual
switch configuration. Of course, it is not necessary that
there be a one-to-one mapping between the pipes. Instead,
incoming packets on a pipe may be switched to one of
many other pipes and hence, switches may have state
which conditions how packets are switched. This switching
state can be determined by the module through interaction
with its peer module. For instance, the NM, as part of
establishing an IP-IP tunnel, may direct an IP module to
switch packets between up-pipe P1 (to another IP module)
and down-pipe P2 (to the underlying ETH module). The
creation of pipe P1 and P2 and the actual switch rule
causes the three modules to interact with their peers and
determine the parameters needed for a low-level rout-
ing rule such as ip route to 204.9.169.1 dev eth1
nexthop 204.9.168.1. Alternatively, it also possible that
the switching state is generated by control protocols and this
is exposed as part of the module abstraction. Section II-F
discusses these alternatives.
3) Filters: The filter abstraction allows modules to de-
scribe whether and how they can filter packets. Filter rules
are described in terms of other abstracted components:
pipes, devices, modules or even module types. Note that
in configuring a filter, the NM only needs to specify the
component names or identifiers that need to be filtered -
it is the protocol implementation that is responsible for
determining the relevant protocol fields (such as addresses
and port numbers). This process and other related issues are
detailed in section II-E.
4) Performance: Unlike the components above, which
are quite specific in nature, performance is harder to specify
and manipulate. In our current abstraction, performance is
reported in terms of six generic performance metrics - delay,
jitter, bandwidth, loss-rate, error-rate, and ordering. These
5Name Caller Callee Description
showPotential NM MA of device Sec. II-D.1
showActual NM MA of device Sec. II-D.1
create, delete NM MA of device Sec. II-D.1
conveyMessage Module Module Sec. II-D.1
(Source) (Destination)
listFieldsAndValues Module Module Sec. II-E
(Inspecting) (Target)
TABLE I
FUNCTIONS THAT ARE PART OF THE CONMAN ARCHITECTURE
encompass most of the IP performance metrics proposed
by IETF [40]; though in our architecture the metrics can
be used by any module that has the ability to describe its
performance, not just the IP module. Additional metrics,
such as power, can be added as needed.
Modules and pipes report on their performance with these
metrics. They can also advertise the ability to offer perfor-
mance trade-offs in terms of these metrics. For example,
many MAC layer protocols offer optional error correcting
checksums which represent a trade-off between error-rate
on one hand and bandwidth and delay on the other. Instead
of exposing the low-level options and associated parame-
ters, modules specify the trade-offs they can enforce. Just as
with filters, the module might allow these trade-offs to be
applied to specific traffic classes as specified by the names
of modules or pipes and this too is advertised.
Similarly, modules may also advertise their explicit per-
formance enforcement capabilities; for example their ability
to queue or shape packets or their ability to enforce cer-
tain service classes. The NM can then use this to satisfy
network-wide performance goals. Due to space constraints,
this paper does not detail the modeling of performance
trade-offs and enforcement in CONMan– we refer the
interested reader to [4].
5) Security: A module may have the means to en-
sure the integrity, authenticity or confidentiality (or some
combination of the three) of its communication with any
given peer. Such modules advertise their ability to establish
secure communication. The state associated with these
security features, for example the keying material, may
be determined by the module through interaction with the
peer module (example, SSL). In other cases, this state may
have to be provided by an external entity and is advertised
as a dependency (example, IP-Sec’s dependency on IKE).
However, security is another aspect that is not discussed in
the paper.
D. Network Manager (NM)
The management channel allows devices in the network
to communicate with the NM. Each device uses this to
inform the NM of its physical connectivity, thus allowing
the NM to determine the network topology. Beyond this,
the NM must configure the network and debug network
problems when they do arise.
1) Network Configuration: Given the network potential,
the NM can achieve high level network configuration goals
Parameter What is advertised?
Name <A,x,y>
Up and Information about up and down pipes such as
Down pipes connectable-modules, dependencies etc.
Physical Information about the physical pipes (if any) connected
pipes to the module
Peerable-Mod. Set of modules that can be peers of this module
Filter Classification based on which filtering can be done - this
includes what can be filtered and where it can be filtered
Switch Possible switching between up, down and physical pipes;
Is the switch state that governs the switching generated
locally or needs to be provided externally
Performance Performance metrics that are reported for the module’s
Reporting pipes, filters, switch etc.
Performance Traffic classes to which performance trade-offs can be
Trade-Offs applied and the possible trade-offs
Performance Apart from the classification based on which perf.
Enforcement can be enforced, the module advertises one of these:
(not (1) Queuing and Shaping capabilities
explained) (2) Service classes on offer
Security Ability to secure communication with the peer modules.
(not If the state needed for this is to be provided, it is
explained) advertised as a dependency.
TABLE II
MODULE ABSTRACTION; showPotential () DESCRIBES EACH
MODULE USING THIS ABSTRACTION
simply by creating and deleting pipes and module compo-
nents. The following primitives capture the NM’s interac-
tion with the devices in the network as part of network
configuration. Table I shows these and other CONMan
primitives offered by the NM and the modules themselves.3
(a). showPotential () allows the NM to determine a device’s
capabilities. The device returns a list of modules with their
abstractions. The type of information returned for each
module is shown in table II.
(b). showActual () allows the NM to determine the state
of modules in a device. The state of each module includes
state for all the pipes, the switch, filters, performance and
security enforcement elements. Also returned is a report on
the performance parameters. In effect, the NM is presented
with the network reality - a module graph and associated
information which allows it to understand how the device
(and hence, the network) is or should be behaving. By
contrast, in the current set up, the NM is presented with all
kinds of MIB objects from which it must deduce network
behavior.
(c). create () and delete () allow the NM to create and
delete pipes, filter-rules, switch-rules and performance en-
forcement state (queuing structures or service classes). The
showPotential () function provides the NM with all the
information it needs to create and delete components.
The NM needs no protocol specific knowledge to use
these primitives. For instance, it can create up-down pipes
simply by satisfying their dependencies and invoking the
create function. For instance, consider a NM creating a pipe
between an IP module and an underlying GRE module.
In terms of today’s configuration, this amounts to creating
a new GRE tunnel which requires a number of low-level
3We do not give details of the CONMan API. However, we do show
the use of these primitives in section III.
6parameters to be specified. With CONMan, it is the GRE
module that coordinates these parameters with its peer GRE
module. For instance, the modules may exchange the tunnel
key values to be used, so the NM does not need to know
the notion of keys. Since the management channel allows
the modules to communicate only with the NM, the NM
provides:
(d). conveyMessage () allows modules to convey messages
to each other through the NM (see detailed example in
section III-B).
2) Debugging: In CONMan, modules can check protocol
parameters with their peers and may actually send packets
over the data plane to detect and localize faults. Such self-
testing may be periodic, event-driven or may be invoked
by the NM. Note that this is not novel per se; layer-1
and layer-2 modules in optical networks already have such
functionality [20]. Further, Microsoft is currently working
on adding a similar functionality to help users debug the
Windows network stack [38]. The self-testing ability of
protocol modules can simplify debugging since the NM can
debug problems in communication between two application
modules by tracing and testing the sequence of modules and
pipes between them. However, our focus on basic configu-
ration implies that the CONMan debugging primitives are
not described here.
E. Hiding Complexity
Much of the reduction in management plane complexity
comes from the fact that the NM operates in terms of the ab-
stract components, while the protocol modules themselves
translate these into concrete protocol objects.
For example, the NM can simply ask a module to filter
packets between two given modules - “drop packets from
module <IP,B,y> and going to <FOO,C,z>” (where FOO
is an application module with up-down pipes to TCP). The
protocol module itself is responsible for determining the
actual protocol fields. For example, given the high-level
specification above, the inspecting module determines that it
needs to “drop packets from source address 128.19.2.3 and
destined to address 20.3.4.5, port 592”. This ensures that
the NM, while being opaque to protocol-specific fields, can
trace the paths between applications and hence, can reason
about its policies regarding a particular application-module.
In some cases, the inspecting module may know what
fields and field values to check for on its own. But in
other cases, it may not. To address this, CONMan modules
provide a listFieldsAndValues () function. This allows other
modules to query the target module for the low-level fields
and field values corresponding to the identifiers associated
with its components. Hence, in the example above, the
inspecting module can send queries to the target modules
<IP,B,y> and <FOO,C,z> (via the NM), as well as to
the modules below them, and ask those modules what field
values it should be checking for.
Such an approach also allows for maintenance of network
state dependencies – the need to update the dependent
state in different modules when some low-level value in
a given module changes. To ensure this, the NM tracks
the dependencies between component identifiers (that have
been resolved) and opaque low-level fields. Also, the NM
installs triggers in the target modules telling them to inform
the NM when their low-level values change.
However, not all detailed protocol values can be or should
be determined by the protocols themselves. For instance,
it appears difficult to expect IP modules to chat among
themselves and assign IP addresses [15]. This is best done
by the NM having explicit knowledge of how to assign
IP addresses (as DHCP servers do today). Similarly, tasks
like regular expression matching in HTML do not seem
amenable to abstraction and should be done by specialized
NMs such as Intrusion Detection Systems. Further, there
are cases such as P2P protocols where protocol designers
don’t want to provide the protocol values since they don’t
want to be filtered. Thus, there are scenarios where the NM
will have to deal with protocol-specific details.
F. Control Modules
Many data-plane protocols rely on externally generated
state for their operation. Today, this may be provided man-
ually as part of the protocol configuration. Alternatively,
control-plane protocols can generate some of the state
required for data plane operation. For example, routing
protocols generate the IP routing table. Similarly, LCP
generates PPP configuration state.
In CONMan, data modules can generate this state by in-
teracting with their peer modules based on the create/delete
primitives invoked by the NM. While this follows from
the general CONMan philosophy, there are cases where
such an approach poses challenges regarding the scalability,
robustness and responsiveness of the network.
Alternatively, even in CONMan, we may rely on control
protocols for the low-level state. However, control modules
do not fit into the generic module abstraction presented
earlier. Instead, they advertise their ability to provide the
state for certain data modules and the NM simply uses
them. For example, the PPP module could advertise that
it has a dependency on external state (say, X) and the
LCP module advertises that it can satisfy dependency X.
While relying on control modules suffices in some cases,
there are also cases when the control module itself requires
quite a bit of configuration. Also, the fact that the NM
does not generate this state hinders its ability to understand
related network operations and gets in the way of root-cause
analysis. Finally, errors in control module operation cannot
always be debugged by the NM. For example, the NM does
not understand BGP and hence, cannot be expected to debug
route flaps and the resulting prefix dampening.
One way to address some of these problems is to let the
NM perform the function of the control protocols whereby
it uses some high-level goal to generate the required state
itself. Of course, this implies that the state generation
logic must be embedded into the NM. For example, the
74D research [17] argues for the replacement of routing
protocols, with the NM using its knowledge of the topology
to set the switch state for IP modules in devices across the
network. A characterization of the scenarios in which state
should be generated by the protocols themselves against
the ones in which existing control protocols should be
used against the ones in which the control protocols should
be replaced is an important research question. However,
in order to explore the limits of our proposal (i.e. what
can be captured and what cannot be captured), this paper
(rather naively) ignores the existence of control protocols.
Instead, our implementation involves the protocol modules
generating the low-level details and the implications of this
are discussed in section III-C.3.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
CONMan does not necessitate any changes to the way
data plane protocols operate. The modeling of protocols
as modules can be implemented as wrappers around exist-
ing implementations. We have implemented four protocol
modules (GRE, MPLS, IP, ETH) as user-level wrappers
around the corresponding existing protocol implementation
in Linux (kernel 2.6.14). In the first part of this section
(section III-B), we use the establishment of GRE tunnels
as an example to detail our GRE module implementation.
We also implemented a NM that understands the CONMan
abstraction and implements the CONMan NM primitives.
To illustrate the operation of CONMan in a real-world
management scenario, we used this NM for configuring
provider-provisioned Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). We
describe the NM implementation and compare CONMan
VPN configurations with configurations today in the second
part of this section (section III-C).
A. Management Channel
The testbed used for the examples described below
comprised of Linux-based PCs operating as end-hosts and
routers with Ethernet as the connecting medium. All the PCs
were equipped with a separate management NIC and con-
nected to a separate network that served as the management
channel for our experiments. Communication between the
protocol modules and the NM was done through UDP-IP
over this management channel. Note that this is not ideal
since the management channel had to be pre-configured.
However, we also implemented a straw-man version of
a management channel that can operate on the same un-
derlying physical network used by the data plane using
the techniques proposed by the 4D project [17] for their
discovery/dissemination plane. Here, the protocol modules
and the NM send management frames encapsulated in
Ethernet frames. This was achieved through sockets of
the SOCK PACKET family that allow user-level processes
to send raw Ethernet frames. Most importantly, no pre-





iii Up.Dependencies Performance Trade-offs to be specified
iv Down.Con-Modules IPv4
v Down.Dependencies None
vi Physical pipes None
vii Peerable-Mod. GRE
viii Filter Nil
ix Switch [Up ⇒ Down],[Down ⇒ Up]
x Perf Reporting Number of recieved and transmitted
packets on each up and down pipe
xi Perf Trade-Offs {[Jitter, Delay] Vs [In-order delivery] |
Up-pipe}
{[Loss-Rate] Vs [Error-Rate] | Up-pipe}
xii Perf Enforcement Nil
xiii Security Nil
TABLE III
ABSTRACTION EXPOSED BY OUR GRE IMPLEMENTATION
B. GRE tunneling
Tunneling is a tool present in the kit of most system
administrators. Traditionally, tunnels have been used for
both plain (IP-IP, GRE) and secure (IP-Sec) communication
between two private networks. Lately, tunnels have also
been used by ISPs for DoS-protection (ArborNetworks [52])
and traffic engineering [53]. In spite of their widespread use,
a look at most network management newsgroups suggests
that tunnels pose many configuration and debugging prob-
lems (about 5-10% of the postings on [58]). For example,
a simple-to-address yet very common problem is the tunnel
end-points not agreeing on parameters such as addresses,
keys etc. An IETF group [12] is looking at exactly such
tunnel configuration problems.
Here, we use the GRE protocol to elucidate the estab-
lishment of tunnels in the proposed architecture. GRE is an
encapsulation protocol that can be used to encapsulate any
network protocol (payload protocol) in any other network
protocol (delivery protocol). We focus on GRE with IPv4 as
the underlying delivery protocol - GRE-IP . Consequently,
each tunnel is characterized by a source and a destination IP
address. Besides this, GRE also involves key’ing of tunnels
- the source and the destination must agree on the key for
the tunnel to operate correctly. Configuring such a GRE-
IP tunnel today requires the management plane to provide
the IP addresses of the tunnel end-points, the key values,
whether to use sequence numbers or not (sequence numbers
help with in-order delivery of tunneled packets) and other
protocol specific details such as tunnel TTL, the TOS field
for tunneled packets, whether to use checksums or not, and
whether to use path-mtu-discovery or not.
We have implemented a GRE module conforming to the
CONMan architecture. As mentioned earlier, our implemen-
tation is based on the Linux GRE kernel module with a user-
level wrapper that confines the protocol-specific details to
the implementation and exposes a generic abstraction to the
NM. This abstraction is shown in table III and some of the
entries are explained below:
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Fig. 2. GRE-IP tunnel between devices A and B - the NM needs to build
the path labeled from (1) to (12).
there should not be any restriction on the modules that the
GRE module can connect to using an up pipe. However,
most implementations restrict the payload protocol to a
well defined list of protocols - with our underlying Linux
implementation, the only payload protocol possible is IPv4.
iii). To create an up pipe, the NM needs to specify the
performance trade-offs (see k below) that apply to pipe.
iv,v). The module is restricted to having IPv4 as the
tunneling protocol with no explicit dependencies.
ix). The module can switch packets between an up-pipe
and a down-pipe. The switching state is generated by the
module on its own.
x). The underlying Linux implementation provides limited
performance reporting: the number of packets transmitted
and received on each up and down pipe.
xi). The module offers the following trade-offs: For a given
up-pipe, it can trade-off delay and jitter for in-order delivery.
The fact that this is attained by enabling sequence numbers
whose use needs to be coordinated with the peer GRE
module is not exposed. Similarly, the module can trade-
off loss-rate for error-rate for a specified up-pipe through
the use of checksums.
To illustrate the relevant implementation details, we now
describe how a NM can use CONMan primitives to achieve
the following low-level goal:
Configure the path between the IP modules <IP,A,a>
and <IP,B,a’> labeled as (1) through (12) in figure 2.
This is equivalent to creating a GRE-IP tunnel between
devices A and B in the existing set-up. In CONMan, the
human manager is not aware of such low-level goals or
the notion of pipes and switches or the CONMan script
shown below. Instead, he/she specifies a high-level goal
that the NM maps to such a low-level goal. The next section
describes an example high-level goal and our implementa-
tion of the mapping process. This mapping process informs
the NM which modules along the path are peers of each
other – in figure 2, the dashed line between pipes labelled
(1) and (12) indicates that modules a and a’ are peer
modules for these pipes (as are modules b and b’). We also
assume that the NM has, as part of the mapping process,
invoked the showPotential primitive at these devices and
hence, is aware of the CONMan abstraction for all the mod-
ules involved; for instance, table III shows the abstraction
exposed by the module <GRE-IP,A,b> (or b for short). The
other modules have similar abstractions that are not shown
here. This equips the NM with all the information it needs to
NM 
conveyMessage (<GRE,B,b’>, GRE-specific parameters) 
MA  
Device A 
MA   
Device B
listFieldsAndValues(<IP, B, c’>) 
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functionName  ( parameters )  
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Packets over data plane paths
conveyMessage (<GRE,A,b>, GRE-specific parameters)  
Key Values,   
 and other parameters 




       (1)
IP-address 











of next-hop  
Command 
(4)
Fig. 3. GRE-IP Tunnel establishment between devices A and B - the
management plane is simplified by ensuring that protocol complexity is
restricted to protocol implementation.
create the appropriate pipes and switch state. As a contrast,
some manual must be read (either by the implementor of
the management application or the system administrator) to
gain the equivalent knowledge while configuring GRE-IP
tunnels today.
With this information at hand, the NM can build the
segment of the path in device A (i.e. a ⇒ b ⇒ c ⇒ d)
using the following script. Note that a similar script needs
to be invoked to build the rest of the path.




(2). P2 = create (pipe, <GRE,A,b>, <IP,A,c>,
<GRE,B,b’>, <IP,B,c’>, None)
(3). create (switch, <GRE,A,b>, P1, P2)
(4). P3 = create (pipe, <IP,A,c>, <ETH,A,d>,
<IP,D,g>, <ETH,D,f>, None)
(5). create (switch, <IP,A,c>, P2, P3)
(6). create (switch, <ETH,A,d>, P3, P4)
In the script, command (1) creates pipe P1 between the
IP module a and the underlying GRE module b. The fourth
and fifth arguments in the command specify the peer IP (a’)
and GRE (b’) modules for the pipe being created. Further,
the NM satisfies the dependency for creating an up pipe
for a GRE module by specifying that it desires in-order
delivery of packets and low error-rate. These choices would
be based on high-level performance goals specified by the
human manager. Similarly, commands (2) and (4) create
pipes P2 and P3. Through command (3) the NM specifies
that GRE module b should switch between pipes P1 and
P2. Similarly, commands (5) and (6) configure the switch
in modules c and d respectively.
The simple and structured process described above is all
the configuration that the NM needs to do. It is the protocols
that incorporate the complexity of determining the low-
level parameters. Each module, based on the commands
invoked by the NM, interacts with its peer module through
the management channel to determine the required protocol
specific parameters – this process is briefly described below
and illustrated in figure 3.
On invocation of command (1) and the corresponding
command on device B, modules b and b’ use the
conveyMessage primitive to exchange the GRE-specific
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Fig. 4. Experimental set-up emulating an ISP and customer sites for the
VPN configuration. Figure 4(b) shows the network map and the modules
seen by the NM prior to configuration.
parameters needed for connectivity between them. These
include the GRE key values in each direction, the use of
sequence numbers, etc. Note that some of these parameters
are based on the trade-off decisions specified by the NM.
For example, the NM, as part of command (1), opts
for in-order delivery. This causes modules b and b’ to
negotiate the use of sequence numbers for the GRE tunnel
between them. Similarly, on invocation of command (2),
IP modules c and c’ figure out the IP addresses of the
tunnel end-points by determining each other’s IP address
through the use of listFieldsAndValues. Command (3)
causes the GRE module b to generate the actual Linux
command to configure the GRE tunnel, the parameters for
this command already having been determined:
ip tunnel add name gre-P1-P2 mode gre remote
204.9.169.1 local 204.9.168.1 ikey 1001 okey 2001
icsum ocsum iseq oseq
Similarly, command (4) causes IP modules c and g to
exchange their IP addresses while command (5) causes IP
module c to generate the low-level routing rule in device
A such that packets to device B are routed through D:
ip route add to 204.9.169.1 via 204.9.168.2 dev
eth2
Note that our implementation of the IP module relies on
ARP for IP-to-MAC mapping and this is exposed in its ab-
straction. Alternatively, it is possible to imagine command
(4) causing ETH modules d and f to exchange their MAC
addresses.
C. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
VPNs are commonly used to connect geographically
distributed enterprise sites across the Internet while offering
security and performance comparable to connecting the
sites across a dedicated network. As the name suggests, a
“provider-provisioned VPN” involves the ISP that provides
connectivity to the enterprise sites configuring and main-
taining the VPN [3]. We implemented a NM that can be
used for such VPN configuration. In the interest of brevity,
the discussion below focusses on the configuration sub-task
Module Connectivity and Switching
<ETH,A,a> Up: {IP, MPLS}, Down: None, Phy: to C1-S1, Switching: [Phy
⇒ Up],[Up⇒ Phy]
<ETH,A,b> Up: {IP, MPLS}, Down: None, Phy: to <ETH,B,c>, Switching:
[Phy⇒ Up],[Up⇒ Phy]
<MPLS,A,o> Up: {IP}, Down: {ETH}, Phy: None, Switching: [Down ⇒
Up],[Up⇒ Down],[Down⇒ Down]
<IP,A,g> Up: {IP, GRE}, Down: {IP, GRE, MPLS, ETH}, Phy: None,
Switching:[Down⇒ Up],[Up⇒ Down],[Down⇒ Down],[Up
⇒ Up]
<IP,A,h> Up: {IP, GRE}, Down: {IP, GRE, MPLS, ETH}, Phy: None,
Switching:[Down⇒ Up],[Up⇒ Down],[Down⇒ Down],[Up
⇒ Up]
<GRE,A,l> Up: {IP}, Down: {IP}, Phy: None, Switching: [Down ⇒
Up],[Up⇒ Down]
TABLE IV
CONNECTIVITY AND SWITCHING CAPABILITIES OF THE MODULES IN DEVICE A.
of an ISP trying to ensure that traffic between two sites S1
and S2 of a customer C1 is isolated from other traffic. A
complete VPN configuration involves doing the same for
all pairs of sites of each customer needing VPN support.
Figure 4(a) shows the relevant part of the set-up in our lab
with five Linux hosts (labeled A-E) serving as two of the
ISP’s edge routers in different POPs (A and C), the ISP’s
core router (B) and customer C1’s routers at site S1 (D)
and site S2 (E). Specifically, the NM aims to achieve the
following high-level goal specified by the human network
manager:
Configure connectivity between sites S1 and S2 of
customer C1.
This is equivalent to the following high-level goal in
CONMan terminology:
Configure connectivity between the customer-facing
interfaces <ETH,A,a> and <ETH,C,f> (see fig-
ure 4(b)) for traffic between C1-S1 and C1-S2.
Ideally, C1-S1 and C1-S2 should be high-level identi-
fiers that get mapped to the IP prefixes for the two sites
through communication between the NM of the ISP and
the NM of customer C1. However, this paper is restricted
to management in a single domain and hence, we provide
the NM with this information. Further, we assume that the
NM has already assigned IP addresses to the IP modules
and is aware of IP address domains. As explained later in
the section, this knowledge is used by the NM in both the
way it finds paths through the network and the CONMan
commands it generates to configure these paths. We admit
that this is case of NM using protocol-specific information.
As mentioned earlier, while it is possible to abstract IP
addresses, their ubiquity and scarcity combined with the
impact of address assignment on routing scalability suggests
that it makes engineering sense to let the NM be aware of
them and this is what we chose for our implementation.
1) NM Implementation: All devices in the ISP’s network
(routers A, B, C) inform the NM of their physical connectiv-
ity through the management channel. Given the aforemen-
tioned goal, our NM implementation invokes showPotential
at these devices to determine the abstraction for the modules
in these devices. Thus, the NM has a network map akin to
the one shown in figure 4(b). This also provides the NM
with information about how the modules can be connected
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Fig. 5. Potential Connectivity sub-graph for device A.
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Fig. 6. Options explored by the NM’s path finder.
to each other and how they can switch packets (shown in
table IV). Based on this, the NM constructs a graph of
potential connectivity with modules as “nodes” and up-
down and physical pipes as “edges”. Figure 5 shows the
device A part of this graph.
The NM also includes a path-finder component that can
find all paths between any two modules in such a graph.
To do so, the component traverses the graph in a depth-
first fashion while avoiding cycles. Further, we made two
modifications to the traversal: First, the NM knows that
a module encapsulates packets in a protocol header when
using [up ⇒ down] and [up ⇒ phy] switching; for example
an ETH module adds an Ethernet header to packets that
it sends out onto a physical pipe. Similarly, a module
decapsulates packets when using [down ⇒ up] and [phy ⇒
up] switching. A module processes the packet header but
doesn’t remove or add headers when using [phy ⇒ phy],
[down ⇒ down] and [up ⇒ up] switching. The traversal
keeps track of such encapsulation and decapsulation by the
modules along the path and hence, restricts itself to paths
that are “sane” in the protocol sense. For instance, assuming
that the path shown in figure 6(a) is the path already
traversed, this rule implies that the next module should be
able to decapsulate or process an IP header and hence, the
only possible next module is the IP module in device B,
<IP,B,i>. This also allows the NM to determine modules
that are peers of each other; in the path above, <ETH,B,c>
decapsulates the encapsulation put in by <ETH,A,b> and
hence, they are peers.
Second, the NM knows the address domains various IP
modules belong to. For instance, <IP,A,g> is assigned an
address from C1-S1 domain (because <IP,A,g> represents
the virtual router connected to C1-S1) while <IP,B,i> is
assigned an address from the ISP’s domain. The traversal
uses this information to rule out invalid paths. For instance,
the path shown in figure 6(b) is an invalid path as it makes
IP modules g and i peers even though they are in different
address domains.
For the given goal, the NM directs the path-finder to
find paths between modules <ETH,A,a> and <ETH,C,f>.
We were expecting the NM to generate the following three
paths (we only show the module-id for each module along
the path):
(a). Using IP-IP tunnel: a, g, h, b, c, i, d, e, j, k, f.
(b). Using GRE-IP tunnel: a, g, l, h, b, c, i, d, e, j, n, k, f.
(c). Using MPLS: a, g, o, b, c, p, d, e, q, k, f.
However, the NM generated six more paths: IP-IP over
MPLS, GRE-IP over MPLS, IP-IP over MPLS only be-
tween A and B, IP-IP over MPLS only between B and C,
GRE-IP over MPLS only between A and B, and GRE-IP
over MPLS only between B and C.4 While this suggests
that we should use more aggressive pruning rules for our
traversal, it also shows that the NM can determine the
various ways of achieving a high-level goal given the
capabilities of the devices in the network. As a contrast,
today it is the human managing the network that relies
on RFCs and device manuals to determine the options
available. Obviously, such an exercise can be misleading
(as was the case when we manually determined the paths
for the example network).
The NM now needs to be able to choose amongst the
paths based on high-level directives and/or other metrics.
We implemented a very simple algorithm that minimizes
the total number of pipes instantiated in the routers. This
is, in some sense, akin to minimizing the amount of state
on the routers and the communication overhead on the NM.
For the scenario in question, the MPLS-based path and the
IP-IP tunnel are the best options (our NM implementation
prefers the MPLS-based path because the MPLS abstraction
mentions that it offers good forwarding bandwidth). We
can also think of more sophisticated metrics such as the
performance capabilities of the modules along the path or
satisfying security constraints. Moreover, while the ability
to choose amongst possible configurations without protocol-
specific knowledge is critical to the CONMan argument, this
is an area that we haven’t explored in any detail.
Once a path is chosen, the NM then automatically gener-
ates the script of CONMan primitives needed to create the
path. This translation of a low-level path creation goal to
CONMan primitives was explained in the previous section
while the complete workflow is shown in the top part of
figure 7(a).
2) Comparing to the status quo: For each path in the ex-
ample above, we directed the NM to generate the CONMan
primitives needed to create the path. These primitives were
invoked at the modules in the devices (routers A, B and
C) to configure them. Since the modules are implemented
as wrappers around existing protocol implementations, they
in turn generate the device-level scripts from the CONMan
4Typically, ISPs use MPLS-over-MPLS [36] or MPLS-over-GRE [44]
for VPN support. Both these configurations are not supported by the Linux
hosts used for our experiments and hence, the NM cannot propose these
paths.
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# Insert the GRE-IP kernel module
(1) insmod /lib/modules/2.6.14-2/ip gre.ko
# Create the GRE tunnel with the appropriate key
(2) ip tunnel add name greA mode gre remote 204.9.169.1
local 204.9.168.1 ikey 1001 okey 2001 icsum ocsum
iseq oseq
(3) ifconfig greA 192.168.3.1
# Enable Routing
(4) echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward
# Create IP routing from customer to tunnel
(5) echo 202 tun-1-2 >> /etc/iproute2/rt tables
(6) ip rule add to 10.0.2.0/24 table tun-1-2
(7) ip route add default dev greA table tun-1-2
# Create IP routing from tunnel to customer
(8) echo 203 tun-2-1 >> /etc/iproute2/rt tables
(9) ip rule add iff greA table tun-2-1
(10) ip route add default dev eth1 table tun-2-1
(11) ip route add to 204.9.169.1 via 204.9.168.2 dev
eth2 (a) Configuration “Today”
Router A Router B Router C
Eth (a)   Eth (b)   
IP  (h)   
Eth (c)   Eth (d)   
IP  (i)
Eth (e)   Eth (f)   
IP  (j)







GRE (l) GRE (n)
Phy Pipe (P4)
(1). P0 = create (pipe, <IP,A,g>, <ETH,A,a>, None, None, None)
(2). P1 = create (pipe, <IP,A,g>, <GRE,A,l>, <IP,C,k>,
<GRE,C,n>, trade-off: in-order delivery, trade-off: error-rate)
(3) create (switch, <IP,A,g>, [P0, dst:C1-S2 ⇒ P1])
(4) create (switch, <IP,A,g>, [P1 ⇒ P0, S2-gateway])
(5). P2 = create (pipe, <GRE,A,l>, <IP,A,h>, <GRE,C,n>,
<IP,C,j>, None)
(6). create (switch, <GRE,A,l>, P1, P2)
(7). P3 = create (pipe, <IP,A,h>, <ETH,A,b>, <IP,B,i>,
<ETH,B,c>, None)
(8). create (switch, <IP,A,h>, P2, P3)
(9). create (switch, <ETH,A,b>, P3,P4)
(b) CONMan configuration (algorithmically generated by the automated NM)
Fig. 7. VPN connectivity between sites S1 and S2 of customer C1 through a GRE-IP tunnel between routers A and C.
#!/bin/bash
# Instantiating MPLS kernel modules
modprobe mpls
modprobe mpls4
# MPLS LSP for traffic from S2->S1
mpls labelspace set dev eth2 labelspace 0
mpls ilm add label gen 10001 labelspace 0
KEY-S2-S1=‘mpls nhlfe add key 0 mtu 1500 instructions
nexthop eth1 ipv4 192.168.0.1 | grep key | cut -c
17-26‘
mpls xc add ilm label gen 10001 ilm labelspace 0
nhlfe key $KEY-S2-S1
# MPLS LSP for traffic from S1->S2
KEY-S1-S2=‘mpls nhlfe add key 0 mtu 1500
instructions push gen 2001 nexthop eth2 ipv4
204.9.168.2 | grep key | cut -c 17-26‘
echo 1> /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip forward
ip route add 10.0.2.0/24 via 204.9.168.2 mpls
$KEY-S1-S2
(a) Configuration “Today”
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MPLS (o)  MPLS(q) 
MPLS(p)
Phy Pipe (P4)
P0 = create (pipe, <IP,A,g>, <ETH,A,a>, None, None, None)
P1 = create (pipe, <IP,A,g>, <MPLS,A,o>, <IP,C,k>,
<MPLS,C,q>, None)
create (switch, <IP,A,g>, [P0, dst:C1-S2 ⇒ P1])
create (switch, <IP,A,g>, [P1 ⇒ P0, S2-gateway])
P2 = create (pipe, <MPLS,A,o>, <ETH,A,b>, <MPLS,B,p>,
<ETH,B,c>, None)
create (switch, <MPLS,A,o>, P1, P2)
create (switch, <ETH,A,b>, P2, P4)
(b) CONMan configuration (algorithmically generated by the automated NM)
Fig. 8. VPN connectivity between sites S1 and S2 of customer C1 using a MPLS LSP through router A, B and C.
# put module0 port 9 into VLAN22
# ensure MTU is set properly
set vlan 22 name C1 mtu 1504
set vlan 22 gigabitethernet0/9
# ensure module 0 port 7 is access port
interface gigabitethernet0/7
switchport access vlan 22
switchport mode dot1q-tunnel
exit
vlan dot1q tag native
end
(a) Configuration “Today” on Cisco CatOS
Switch A Switch B Switch C
Eth (a)   
VLAN  (d)   
Eth (b)   
VLAN  (e)   
Eth (c)   
VLAN  (f)   







P1 = create (pipe, <ETH,A,a>, <VLAN,A,d>, <ETH,C,c>,
<VLAN,C,f>)
P2 = create (pipe, <VLAN,A,d>, <ETH,A,a>, <VLAN,B,e>,
<ETH,B,b>)
create (switch, <ETH,A,a>, [P0, Tagged ⇒ P1])
create (switch, <ETH,A,a>, [P1 ⇒ P0])
create (switch, <VLAN,A,d>, P1, P2)
create (switch, <ETH,A,a>, P2, P4)
(b) CONMan configuration (algorithmically generated by the automated NM)
Fig. 9. VPN connectivity between sites S1 and S2 of customer C1 through VLAN tunneling between switches A and C.
primitives. It is the management plane that needs to generate
these device-level scripts with today’s setup. Below we
compare the configurations for two of these paths: the GRE-
IP and the MPLS path.
Figure 7(a) shows a Linux configuration snippet at router
A that establishes a GRE tunnel to router C and carries
traffic between sites S1 and S2 of customer C1. As a
contrast, the desired module connectivity and the CONMan
commands invoked by the NM at router A to achieve this
are shown in figure 7(b). These commands were explained
in section III-B. Similarly, figures 8 shows the Linux and
CONMan configuration snippet needed to establish the
MPLS path.
Note that while our testbed capabilities constrained us
to Layer-3 VPNs, some ISPs establish VPN connectivity
at Layer-2. This is typically achieved using Ethernet-over-
MPLS or PPP-over-L2TP. Recently, VLAN tunneling has
been proposed as another means of doing so [45] and as the
use of Ethernet in wide-area networks increases, this could
be a future VPN technology. Consequently, we also present
the Cisco CatOS and CONMan configuration snippet to
establish a VLAN tunnel in figure 9.
The figures show that configuration today requires the
management plane to specify a lot of low-level details. As
a result, it is difficult to build management applications
that automatically generate these configurations. Instead,
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GRE MPLS VLAN
T C T C T C
Generic Commands 1 2 1 2 3 2
Specific Commands 6 0 6 0 4 0
Generic State Var. 9 21 6 18 3 14
Specific State Var. 11 2 8 2 5 1
TABLE V
COMMANDS AND STATE VARIABLES IN THE SCRIPTS TODAY (T) AND WITH
CONMAN (C). THE TABLE AND THE SCRIPTS ARE COLOR/FONT CODED; FOR
INSTANCE, THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF A “GENERIC COMMAND” IN EACH
SCRIPT APPEARS IN RED/ITALICS AND SO ON.
many management applications provide a better user inter-
face and/or some syntactic sugar to the human manager (this
is useful in itself). Even with these applications, the human
manager still needs to provide the specifics and this leaves
the door open for many kinds of errors; for instance, some
error possibilities in figure 7(a) include not configuring
device A as a router (command 4), misconfiguring the
underlying routing so that traffic from the wrong customer
goes into a tunnel or the tunneled traffic is delivered to
the wrong customer at the other end (commands 5-9),
configuring the tunnel end points with the wrong key values
(command 2), using tunnel end point IP addresses that
are wrong or do not have IP connectivity between them
(command 2), etc.
The CONMan scripts do not appear any-less-fragile.
However, as mentioned earlier, the human manager
doesn’t need to see, much less write, these scripts. All
the identifiers in the script, such as the module and device
identifiers, are exposed by the devices themselves and learnt
by the NM through showPotential. Further, there is very
little protocol-specific information in CONMan scripts and
hence, an automated NM can generate the commands
and other details algorithmically without incorporating
protocol-specific knowledge. Also, the similarity in the
CONMan scripts for three completely different protocols
can be seen as retrospective (yet relevant) evidence of
CONMan decoupling the management plane from data-
plane evolution. As a matter of fact, the VLAN tunneling
scenario above is a good example of how, with CONMan
in place, the same management logic can deal with new
data-plane technologies as and when they arise.
To quantify the protocol-agnosticity of CONMan, we
counted the number of protocol-specific commands and
state variables in the scripts. Table V shows that today’s
scripts have far more protocol-specific commands and state-
variables. As mentioned earlier, the instances of protocol-
specific state variables in CONMan scripts (such as C1-
S2 representing the IP prefix for customer1-site2 on line
(3) of figure 7(b)) result from the fact that our current
effort is restricted to management in a single domain. On
the other hand, CONMan scripts have more generic state-
variables. This is an outcome of both the verbose nature of
the existing CONMan primitives and the fact that CONMan
requires the NM to specify a lot of well-structured and
systematically learnt generic information which the protocol
modules then use to determine the protocol parameters.
GRE MPLS VLAN
Messages Sent 3n+2 3n-2 3n-2
Messages Received 2n+2 2n-1 2n-1
TABLE VI
MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED BY THE NM OVER THE
MANAGEMENT CHANNEL.
While we admit that these represent very coarse metrics, we
see this as a naive yet important step towards quantifying
the advantages of having management applications generate
CONMan primitives instead of device-level configuration.
Apart from easing configuration, CONMan also simpli-
fies the debugging of errors by a NM. For example, in case
of the VPN example, errors like a wire getting cut off or a
port on a line card not working will show up in the topology
map that the NM maintains. By tracing the protocol graph,
the NM may even report what applications are likely to be
affected by such an error. On the other hand, errors like an
invalid filter rule in the network that blocks IP connectivity
between the tunnel end points will be detected when the
NM inspects the state of the module with the filter rule.
And errors like path MTU problems are detected when NM
asks the IP module to self test its connectivity to its peer.
While the NM may only be able to address some of these
issues, the debugging done by the NM would certainly be
useful when the system administrator is called in. However,
such debugging capabilities have not been implemented yet
and are part of future work.
3) Messaging Overhead: An important concern regard-
ing our approach is the amount of communication overhead
imposed on the NM. Table VI shows the number of man-
agement messages sent and received by the NM in three
scenarios assuming n routers along the path (for our lab set-
up, n=3). For instance, to set up a GRE tunnel, the current
NM implementation sends commands to each router along
the path (n sent), conveys messages between the two GRE
modules in devices A and B (2 sent, 2 received), conveys
messages between the two IP modules in devices A and B
(2 sent, 2 received) and conveys messages between the IP
modules in each pair of consecutive devices along the path
(2n-2 sent, 2n-2 received). The table shows that, at least
in the VPN configuration scenario, the messaging overhead
scales linearly with the diameter of the network. However,
the more important question is the overhead resulting from
a large number of such and other configurations.
On a more general note, there are scenarios where the
CONMan approach leads to obvious scaling and robustness
concerns. For instance, an extreme scenario would be one
where the NM configures modules across the network
whenever an application initiates a connection. Note that in
such a set-up, the message overhead imposed on the NM(s)
would be similar to that imposed on domain controllers in
the SANE project [9] and one could use their results to
claim that even this can scale. However, for a lot of tasks,
the NM can use existing control protocols. For instance,
our current path-finder could easily be modified to use a
hierarchical two-step traversal wherein the first step finds
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paths between devices that have been pre-established using
a routing algorithm while the next step finds the complete
module-level path given the device-level path. Apart from
this, CONMan would certainly benefit from many of the
proposals to improve the scalability of automated agents
within today’s SNMP framework [16,27,33]. Further, as
we discuss in section V, the NMs themselves may do
specialized jobs and hence, scale by divide-and-conquer.
IV. RELATED WORK
There is a tremendous amount of past work in net-
work management, the most relevant of which we briefly
cite here. On the commercial side, SNMPLink [34] lists
many existing management tools, from low-end tools like
packet analyzers (eg, Wireshark [51]), traffic monitors (eg,
MRTG [39]), and SNMP agents (eg, ITM [8]) to high-end
managers like OpenView [47].
Zeroconf [57] (and similar efforts like UPnP [50],
DLNA [56], etc.) enable “local communication in networks
of limited scale” without any configuration [18]. CON-
Man is more general (even though the examples in this
paper focus on enterprise and ISP networks) but there are
networks, such as ad-hoc networks, that we don’t deal
with. Further, with CONMan, the human manager does
need to specify a configuration goal, albeit at a high-level.
However, there are a number of Zeroconf features, such as
address auto-configuration using link-local addresses, that
CONMan could gain from. Policy-based management [19]
tries to reduce the amount of intricate knowledge required
by human managers by allowing management of QoS [2,35]
and security [41] based on high-level policies. There are
efforts in both research [54] and industry [46–49] with
the similar goals. While steps in the right direction, some
entity still has to map these policies to the individual
device configurations. The complexity of this translation
was the major impediment in the adoption of policy-based
networking [21]. CONMan has similar objectives since
human network managers only specify the configuration
goals that are to be achieved and don’t deal with low-level
commands (not even CONMan primitives).
CONMan says nothing about how data-plane protocols
should be implemented. However, there is the vast body of
literature that does deal with protocol implementation, i.e.
through abstractions [1], specification languages (Estelle,
LOTOS, SDL [42]), implementation languages [11,28,29],
and modularization (Click [23], [6]).
The 4D proposal [17] recognizes the complexity of the
Internet’s control and management plane and hence, argues
for restructuring them. We were motivated by, among other
things, 4D’s decision plane. Recently, there has been a
spurt of research detailing the reasons for outages and
anomalies in IP backbones [26,31], Internet services [32]
and BGP routing [14,30]. These studies point to configura-
tion errors as a major culprit. CONMan can reduce these
errors, particularly the ones impacting data plane operation.
The basic idea behind CONMan was proposed in earlier
work [5]. Finally, we believe that CONMan can simplify
the cross-layer database and interface proposed in [24], the
dependency discovery proposed in [13], and indeed may
provide the basis for the Knowledge Plane objectives laid
out by Clark et. al. [10].
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a network architecture
that is amenable to management. Implementation of a few
protocols according to the CONMan model and their use
in VPN configuration scenarios shows that the approach is
worth considering. Though it is too early for us to claim
that the abstraction presented here suffices for all data
plane protocols and for tasks beyond basic configuration,
we do not envision the module abstraction expanding much
beyond its current state. As with OSs where we rely on
ioctls and special-purpose interfaces for things that cannot
be accomplished with the file system interface, in cases
where protocol features are not captured by the abstraction
(some were mentioned in the paper but we hope they will
be few and far between), the low-level parameters will have
to explicitly be set. Hence, we allow for the possibility of
management applications accessing low-level details and
provide the relevant hooks. However, we necessitate that
any direct changes to the low-level details be appropriately
reflected in the protocol’s CONMan abstraction.
Our current attempt has focussed on a single NM man-
aging a given network. However, multiple NMs may exist.
Primary and secondary NMs will be needed for robustness.
We can also imagine multiple simultaneously operating
NMs. One reason for this might be that NMs do specialized
jobs. For example, one is responsible for tunnel creation
while another monitors for security violations. Another
reason might be that NMs are administratively nested. For
example, a high-level NM creates VLANs, but each VLAN
has its own NM. Different domains will have their own NM
and these may need to communicate.
These possibilities present a number of challenges such
as the need for scoped management channels, extending the
management channel beyond a single domain, the possibil-
ity of conflicting configurations and so on. Consequently,
the notion of a management channel needs more thought.
However, we would still like to keep the management
channel as simple as possible so we don’t run into the
problem of managing the management channel. Further, the
robustness and scalability questions regarding this channel
suggest that it should only be used as the basis for low-level
configuration. Higher-level management tasks should then
rely on the data-plane for communication.
The NM design requires more work – both on the user-
side (example, coming up with good high-level goals or
even a language for such goals) and on the network-side
(example, ensuring that the translation process can scale to
large network). Another important question is how to deploy
CONMan. It is likely to share IPv6’s conundrum: namely
that complexity has to be increased over the short-term in
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order to arrive at reduced complexity over the long-term.
However, there is still a lot of work to be done before we
can worry about the widespread adoption of CONMan and
hence, the path of least resistance towards a manageable,
much less a self-managing network.
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